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Article 10

RECENT CASE NOTES
which the Supreme Court took upon this point must have been a correct
one. There is substantial authority for this proposition, the cases seeming
to grant to the injured plaintiff an election between remedies for breach of
contract and for tort. On this point, in general, see: 15 Encyc. Pleading
and Practice, 1121; 5 R. C. L., Sec. 702.
A significant feature of the case is the fact that the Court apparently
concedes that a foreign corporation, legally "doing business" in a state, and
legally present there, is nevertheless amenable only to suit growing out of
business done within that jurisdiction. Had the action been on the contract
liability, then clearly it could be said to be one arising out of business done
in the State of Louisiana, for the contract was entered into in that state.
Quoting the opinion: "A foreign corporation is amenable to suit to enforce a personal liability if it is doing business within the jurisdiction in
such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is
present there. Even when present and amenable to suit it may not, unless
it has consented, be sued on transitory causes of action arising elsewhere
which are unconnected with any corporate action by it within the jurisdiction." (Italics ours.) The court then proceeds to bring the case within this
rule by holding that the cause of action was, in fact, one connected with
business done within the jurisdiction. It was plain that the corporation
itself was present within the state, doing business there. If the Supreme
Court had not believed that this in itself was insufficient, but that the cause
of action must have arisen from corporate action within the jurisdiction,
then it would have been unnecessary for it to go to the extent it did to show
that the business was done within the state.
That the case is perhaps an innovation in the law as to jurisdiction over
foreign corporations may be indicated by the following reference from the
American Law Institute restatement of the law of Conflict of Laws, published in 1926: "Special Note-It has not yet been settled by the Supreme
Court of the United States whether, when a corporation does intrastate
business in a state it subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the state as to
causes of action not arising out of the business done within the state, so
that the state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over it by serving
an agent of the corporation." Am. Law. Inst. Restatement No. 2, p. 83.
The Restatement, however, adopts the rule requiring that the suit arise out
of such local transaction, and has furnished considerable authority in point.
The principal case states the rule a little more broadly, i. e., jurisdiction
extends to all causes of action connected with business done in the state, regardless of whether or not the cause of action arises out of the business
done, in the technical sense.
It is submitted that such a rule would tend to eliminate much of the
inconvenience and expense which now result from the practice of serving a
corporation in some states where the plaintiff believes he will be more fortunate at the hands of the courts and juries, and requiing parties and witnesses to attend the trial from points sometimes at a great distance from
the site of the tribunal so chosen.
C. W. W.
PLEADING-JOINDER OF PARTIES AND ACTION-This was an action of appellees for damages resulting from fire from appellant's engines. The first
paragraph was for the loss of a barn of the value of $600. The appellee
insurance company had insured the barn for $200, and now, after full pay-
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ment of the claim, claims to be subrogated to that amount. The second
paragraph asked damages caused by destruction of personal property in the
barn. The appellant railway made motion for separation of causes of action
and demurred to each paragraph for misjoinder, but both were overruled
by the court. There was verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $600 for
full value of the barn and that appellee insurance company be subrogated
to $200 of same; and for $400 for the personal property loss. The appellant, on appeal assigns as error the court's action in overruling the motion
for separation and the demurrer for misjoinder. Baltimore & Ohio By.
Co. v. Day et al., 166 N. E. 668, June 7, 1929.
HELD: Affirmed. Under the statute Sec. 277, Burns' 1926 Revised
Annotated Statutes which provides, "all parties united in interest must join
as plaintiffs or defendants" the court held here the parties had become
united by subrogation and therefore must be joined. As for there being
two actions the court held it might be recovered in one action in the same
paragraph by the owner. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Kern, 9 Ind. App. 505.
The action of the lower court in overruling the demurrer seems to be contrary to the wording of Sec. 286 which reads, "Plaintiff may unite several
causes of action in the same complaint when they are included in the following classes ...
Second. Injuries to property, but the causes of action
so joined must affect all the parties to the action," etc. Section 900 says
the word "property" denotes both real and personal property, but here all
the parties are not affected. The lower court probably erred in its rulings
but in Indiana the matter is left to the discretion of the court because of
Sec. 364, which states, "There can be no reversal for failure to sustain or
overrule a demurrer for misjoinder of causes of action." The ultimate effect of Indiana practice is the same as other states except the court makes
fewer steps and does not follow the strict common law rule. Pomeroy,
Code Remedies.
In states having similar or the same rule as to joinder of plaintiffs, the
majority have held that the insured and the insurer may join after subrogation of rights. Oregon and Washington have allowed joinder when only
the word "shall" appears rather than "must." In Gaugler et al v. Chicago,
etc., Ry. Co., 197 Fed. 79, which is a suit for more than the insurance by
the owner and the insurance company, the court states the plaintiffs are
"co-owners of the insured's cause of action . . . required to join" on the

basis there is but one cause which can not be split. It has been held that
to give damages to joint plaintiffs and deny remedy of damages as to other
injuries caused by the same act would be making a useless distinction.
Fairbanks et al v. San Francisco Ry. Co., 115 Cal. 579. Where there is
but one wrongful act, causing but one loss and creating one liability, it
makes no difference whether the insurer takes by subrogation or assignment. Where there is one cause of action, those interested must adjust in
one action. Supra.
In Indiana the question of joinder because of subrogation was decided
in PittsburghC. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Home Insurance Co., 183 Ind. 355, where
the equitable rule was adopted allowing it. The same is allowed in cases of
indemnity insurance on an automobile. Auto Owner Exch. v. Edwards,
136 N. E. 577. In case the insured sues in his own name the insured becomes the trustee for the insurer. Kansas City etc. By. Co. v. Shutt, 104
Pac. 51.
R. R. D.

